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Abstract 
 
 Organ donation shortages are a problem in Nevada. A shift in policy towards an opt-out 
system could more than double the number of registered organ donors in Nevada. A Libertarian 
Paternalistic strategy would allow potential donors to express their preference for organ 
donations more accurately. Currently Nevada abides by an opt-in policy where people are only 
organ donors if they explicitly request to become donors. Under an opt-out policy, people would 
be presumed organ donors unless they requested not to be donors. Policy changes during the 
2015 Legislative session were a good start but failed to fully utilize behavioral economics to 
resolve the shortage. This paper aggregates studies determining how and why people make 
decisions, explores potential organ donation strategies, examines opinion polls, and explains 
organ markets and kidney transplants more generally to suggest Nevada shift to an opt-out model 
for organ donations. Reform to statewide donor policy is needed; at stake are the lives of Nevada 
citizens currently on the waiting list and those who will be added in the coming years.  
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SB206, A Step In The Right Direction 
 
 Nevada 2015 legislative session made significant changes to Nevada’s organ donation 
policy. The approval of SB 206 changed the way citizens registered as organ donors and eased 
the process of remaining a donor once a person had chosen to register. Previously, when an 
applicant filed for a license at the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) the person was asked if 
they would like to become an organ donor under an opt-in model. An opt-in model does not 
donate a person’s organ unless the person explicitly consents.  The question was posed as, 
“would you like to be an organ donor” followed by the mandated response of “yes” or “no” 
(Hammond, 2015). When people agreed to be organ donors they were presented with the same 
question every time they renewed their license. Because a person is presented with the same 
question again, often times a person would not renew the agreement to remain an organ donor. 
The result was people “falling off the radar” (Ferreria, 2015).  
As a result of SB 206, the question will now be asked differently and organ donors will 
remain on the registered donor list unless they decide to remove themselves. The new policy 
follows the opt-in model asking the question, “would you like to be an organ donor” with one 
caveat. Instead of mandating a choice of “yes” or “no”, the new response options are “yes” or 
“not at this time.” For those who have not previously chosen to be organ donors they will be 
asked if they would like to be organ donors. People who have previously chosen to be organ 
donors will now be notified that their status as an organ donor remains unchanged unless they 
wish to change it.  
Public policy should aim to make these types of interactions efficient by allowing people 
to choose freely while optimizing societal outcomes. Thaler and Sunstein (2008) have coined this 
strategy libertarian paternalism. By definition these terms seem to be in contradiction. From a 
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traditional economics standpoint, people are rational actors who think through their decisions 
objectively to optimize their positions. While there are many instances where actors decide using 
a cost-benefit analysis to make a decision, this is not always the case. Inherent biases such as the 
framing of a question, ambiguous projected outcomes, status quo biases towards defaults and 
even mindless choosing show that people are not always the ideal actors economists would hope 
exist. Instead people will sometimes succumb to nudges in one direction or another based on the 
framing of questions or the ease of making a decision in one direction. 
It is important that these nudges do not drastically raise the transaction cost of acting 
freely. “To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be cheap and easy to avoid” (Thaler and 
Sunstein, 6). If the nudge becomes a mandate it has gone too far. For instance, banning cigarettes 
would not be a nudge. However, putting a cancer warning on a pack on cigarettes may push 
people to think more about their decision to smoke without making smoking inaccessible making 
it a nudge. SB 206 both nudges a person in a desirable direction and reduces the transaction costs 
associated with becoming an organ donor.   
The reason why SB 206 would increase organ donations relies on behavioral psychology. 
It is important to note that most people have indicated that they want to be organ donors. 
Calandrillo (2004) showed that 80% of US citizens believe organ donations are a good thing. 
Kurtz and Saks (1996) found the percentage to be even higher. Kurtz and Saks analyzed both a 
National Gallup poll and Iowa procurement study that asked respondents about their level of 
support for organ donations. The findings of the Gallup poll were that 85% of those surveyed 
supported organ donations. The Iowa procurement study found 97% of respondents were 
supporters of organ donations. A Department of Health and Human Health Survey (2012) found 
94.9% of those polled were strongly in support of organ donations. Because of the lack of 
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Nevada specific data, the nation-wide Gallup poll data and NHHS polls may be more applicable 
to assessing Nevada attitudes towards organ donations.  
Even though attitudes are in favor of organ donations, Nevadans donate organs at a 
relatively low rate. Nevada donates fewer organs on a per-capita basis than other states of similar 
size. Arkansas, with a population similar to Nevada, registers 58% of potential donors. 
Oklahoma registers 64% (DLA, 2014). In Nevada the percentage of eligible donors is 40%. This 
places Nevada 40th among US states according to the National Donor Designation Report Card 
(DLA, 2014).  
Kate McCullough, of the Nevada Donor Network, noted that there is a shortage of 
123,000 kidneys nationwide, with a shortage of 550 annually in Nevada. The shortfall in number 
of organs donated continues to increase overtime. McCullough (2015) noted that 6 people are 
added to the national donor waiting list every hour, and 21 people die every day due to lack of 
access to an organ.  
There are several reasons a person may need a kidney transplant. Rising life expectancies 
enable core organs, such as the heart and brain that are not regularly transplanted, to outlive 
organs that are equally essential to living, such as a kidney or liver. Increases in obesity rates and 
the prevalence of diseases that target and debilitate specific organs increase demand for organ 
transplants. Modern medicine enables doctors to remove an organ that is no longer functioning 
properly and replace it with another.  
If a person is on the waiting list for a kidney but needs a functional alternative more 
immediately, there are expensive alternatives to a kidney donation. Dialysis costs on average 
$75,000 per year with more than 350,000 people receiving the treatment annually (Kaseran and 
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Osterkamp, 2013)1. Several scholars predict demand for organs will increase in the coming 
years. Kaseran and Osterkamp (2013) see the problem as an intricate web of various causes. 
Their prediction is 160,000 people will be on the waiting list nationwide for organs every year. 
While people wait on the list, they calculate our country will see 200,000 deaths because of a 
kidney shortage in the next few decades.  
This paper will explain kidney transplants, the function of an existing and ideal kidney 
market and suggests additional policy changes stemming from similar behavioral justifications of 
SB206. While the recent changes are a good start, an opt-out model will not resolve the shortage. 
Transitioning the donor registry to an opt-out system, whereby a person is presumed to be an 
organ donor unless the person explicitly refuses, has the potential to substantially increase organ 
donations beyond current levels.  
                                                        
1 Systemic problems stemming from an organ shortage are harder to quantify. Often times wealthy Americans travel to developing 
countries to buy a kidney.  This type of black market organ tourism is only beginning to be fully understood and dealt with by international 
bodies. With over 10,000 illegal organs transplants occurring annually, the World Health Organization has begun an international dialogue to 
address the problem (López-Fraga, 2014).  
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Kidney Transplants: A Background 
 
A kidney transplant is defined as “a surgical procedure in which a healthy kidney from 
one person is placed into another whose kidneys have stopped working” (Tilney et al. p.1). A 
patient must be placed on a statewide or national waiting list to receive an organ. A doctor must 
establish that a patient has a legitimate medical condition and needs a kidney. Insurance provider 
must also approve the request.  
Buying and selling organs is currently illegal in the United States. Federal law makes 
monetary compensation for organ transfers a felony under the National Organ Transplant Act of 
1984. Since no formal market exists, the organ exchange relies on donations and exchanges 
between donors and recipients.  
To understand how to best motivate people to donate, we have to first understand why 
people donate. In a traditional market people respond to financial incentives. In an organ market 
people respond to ethical incentives. People, as rational actors, make decisions based on a set of 
cost-benefit analyses that includes inputs that are sometimes difficult to quantify monetarily. 
Rothman (2006) breaks these incentives into two categories, “extrinsic” and “intrinsic.” A 
Person is intrinsically motivated to give to another because it is ethical. These motivations can 
sometimes be trumped by financial considerations (Rothman, 2006). The process of donation 
often requires a donor take time off work, pay for hospital visits, and follow-ups. When a person 
decides these costs are greater than the value of the intrinsic good, they decide not to donate.  
Transplant centers must determine the quality of donations. Two determinants of 
compatibility allow medical markers to predict a successful transplant. The first is Blood type. 
Type A can receive and donate an organ to any person with blood type A. Type B can receive 
and donate to any person with blood type B. Type AB can receive from either A or B but can 
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only donate to AB. Type O can donate to any of the 
blood types, but can only receive O. (Roth, 2012). This 
is depicted in the figure to the right. 
The Stanford Blood Center (2015) releases data 
on percentages of the population in each blood type. 
Blood type O makes up 44% of the population. Blood 
type A is 42%. Blood type B is 10%. The least frequent blood type is AB with 4% of the 
population. Given this information Donors with blood type O are most desirable because they 
can donate to the largest percentage of the population. Being blood type AB makes a person 
most eligible to receive a donation.  
The second requirement for a match is human leukocyte antigen tissue typing (HLA). 
While over 100 different HLA proteins exist, 6 have been shown to be most relevant in testing 
organ donation compatibility (Tilney, 8). This system is more complex than purely blood type. 
Even with perfect matching antigens a body could still reject an organ. Often times a kidney is 
transplanted without matching antigens yet the body still allows full integration (UC Davis 
Transplant Center, 2015). The discrepancies in expected outcome show a pure match is not 
always perfect; still an ideal match is better than a non-ideal. 
Tilney et al (2005) found higher levels of similarity correlate with successful transplants, 
while larger differences in blood type and protein compatibility lead to lower success rates. A 
complete match in a paired transplant yields a 95% success rate. Partial-matches, where some 
proteins are not identical, yield an 85% success rate. This is compared to a cadaveric transplant, 
which has an 80% chance of success (Tilney et al., 12-2). Cadaveric transplants have the same 
matching requirements as living donations. 
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Roth (2012) indicates that studies have shown transplants from cadavers to living patients 
have lower chances of success. Ferreria (2015) hypothesizes this is due to a smaller than ideal 
organ donor network. A majority of paired exchanges in Nevada occur between living related 
people (Ferreria, 2015). Often times this is from a spouse or other individual who is compatible. 
Because of the patient and donors relationship, they often times have a similar genetic history. 
Donors and patients with similar genetic history are a closer biological match than cadaveric 
donations, which have no biological relationship. A cadaveric kidney recipient is on a waiting 
list because the recipient does not have either an eligible or willing family member to supply the 
kidney. Since the kidney is not from an immediate relative, it is likely less compatible based on 
blood type and HLA proteins leading to a lower rate of transplant success. A stronger organ 
network that connects more donors with recipients in need could resolve some of the 
compatibility issues. 
Living donations from unrelated donors are much less common. When they do occur, 
they are the result of paired or indirect exchange. A paired exchange occurs when a biologically 
incompatible donor-recipient pair exchanges an organ with another biologically incompatible 
donor-recipient pair to receive a compatible organ. Roth (2004) explains these occur when one 
pair of donor-recipients would like to exchange, but are unable due to compatibility issues.  
Paired exchanges are facilitated by transplant centers. The transplant center requires a 
pair, interested in matching with another pair to exchange organs, register their interest at the 
transplant centers they intend to conduct their operation (Ferreira, 2015). After having registered, 
transplant centers will seek out compatible pairs to connect and swap organs with.  
To better understand the exchange, an example of this organ market in practice would 
involve a married couple from Reno who is attempting to conduct to engage in a kidney 
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transplant. After testing the couples blood types and HLA compatibility, the transplant center 
tells the group from Reno their transplant is unlikely to be successful and refuses the transplant 
request. At the same time a married couple from Las Vegas were attempting to engage in a 
kidney transplant, but the wife and husband were not compatible. Since both husbands still 
wanted to donate a kidney to their wives, both pairs registered with their nearest transplant 
centers to find another couple with whom to exchange. After the couples from Las Vegas and 
Reno were paired by the transplant center based on biological compatibility, they entered 
transplant surgery simultaneously. During the operation the husband from Las Vegas had his 
kidney removed and transplanted into the wife from Reno. In a separate operating room the 
husband from Reno had his kidney transplanted into the wife from Las Vegas. Because paired 
exchanges the husbands were able to donate their kidneys to save the lives of their spouses.  
These donations occur concurrently with both pairs in operating rooms undergoing 
surgery at the same time. Because a financial penalty cannot be imposed to encourage an organ 
exchange, it would be impossible to force to husband from Reno to donate his kidney after his 
wife had received her kidney from the exchange (Roth, 2012). If the exchange between the Las 
Vegas husband and Reno wife was to occur on Monday, and the exchange between the Reno 
husband and Las Vegas wife was planned on a Friday, there would be no way to ensure the Reno 
husband would still be willing to perform the operation after his wife had received her kidney. 
The uncertainty effectively makes concurrent operations the only option.    
On a larger scale, paired exchanges can effectively facilitate living donations when 
couples are not compatible. In early 2015 a group of 34 couples engaged in paired exchanges 
(Associated Press, 2015). Through the National Kidney Registry, and various hospitals 
associated, the groups were able to match with better levels of compatibility. However, more 
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work is needed to increase registrants in paired exchanges and strengthen the overall donor 
network (Ferreria, 2015).  
Indirect exchanges are an alternative option between a patient who does not have a donor 
and an incompatible donor-recipient pair in need of a kidney. While only the couple can offer a 
kidney, the patient possesses something of interest for the couple. A patient can exchange his or 
her place on the waiting list for a kidney from the donor of the pair (Roth, 3).  
When taking into account the genetic markers that make a kidney transplant successful, it 
is understandable why this type of exchange may be mutually beneficial. If the donor pair both 
have blood type O but HLA markers make them incompatible, the donor may opt for an indirect 
exchange. Since any blood type can receive a person with type O organs, a person on the waiting 
list with blood type AB and similar enough HLA markers would be an ideal candidate to receive 
the kidney. If the recipient were high enough on the list to make the exchange worthwhile for the 
donor group the partner may conduct the exchange to increase a chance a compatible cadaveric 
organ became available soon.  
Imagine a situation where a person with blood type B had been on a waiting list for 2 
years. We will call her Jessica. Since Jessica has been on the list for a long period of time, she is 
very likely to be close to the top. When an organ becomes available Jessica would be one of the 
first to be screened for compatibility. While Jessica can receive a transplant from blood type O 
and B, she has not been able to find a match with the desirable HLA proteins. At the same time a 
couple is seeking an exchange. The husband is blood type B and the wife is blood type O. 
Because blood type B cannot donate to blood type O, the husband is unable to donate to his wife. 
Given that blood type O is the most common blood type, if the wife were near the top of a 
waiting list it is likely a compatible cadaveric kidney would become available soon. The donor-
Nevada Should Opt-in to Organ Policy Changes 
 Velto  13 
pair could decide it is in their best interest for the husband to donate his kidney to Jessica in 
exchange for his wife receiving Jessica’s spot on the waiting list.  
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How Organ Markets Do and Should Operate  
  
Since an organ market does not establish a price for the good, the market must be thought 
of differently than traditional markets. A person donates at a price of zero, with the potential 
costs being discomfort and risks of uncertain externalities (CIROD, 2006). The donor’s “gain” is 
based on the altruistic benefit of the donation. An ideal altruistic market would supply enough 
organs to meet demand. Because the market cannot use financial rewards to increase the supply 
of organs, public policy and education are used to increase the number of organs donated.  
Efficiency is “the degree to which resources are used to generate the most productive 
outcomes” (Wheelan, 154). Mutually beneficial trade occurs when an individual can be made 
better off without making another person worse off (Wheelan, 155). For an organ exchange 
market to work an individual should be able to donate his or her organ and receive a beneficial 
gain without suffering a greater financial cost.  
Roth (2012) looks at stable matching to understand and repair matching markets that are 
not operating efficiently. What distinguishes matching markets from traditional markets is that 
price is not the only relevant factor. Marriage is one such market because marriage requires a 
mutually beneficial transaction. Not only does a person have to choose a mate, the mate has to 
also choose them (Roth, 344). The objective becomes creating the best match for all parties 
involved.  
Roth uses the Gale-Shapley algorithm to explain a stable market (Roth, 345). The Gale-
Shapley algorithm defines a stable trade as an allocation where no individual would think they 
would be better off through another transaction. If a transaction were not stable, one or both 
actors would continue seeking out more beneficial trades. 
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This understanding of markets is relevant for Organ donations because there needs to be 
as close to a core match as possible. Kidney exchanges are matching markets, meaning that the 
donors must be willing to participate in the trade and be genetically compatible. A core match 
exists when the donor and recipient would not be better off if they were matched with a different 
donor or recipient. Additionally, players must not want to go outside of the established 
marketplace. If a potential recipient goes outside of the exchange market it is because the 
exchange is not meeting their needs. They are taking with them not only an organ, but also the 
possibility of satisfying demand from another player in the marketplace (Roth, 346). In the 
context of organ markets, going out of the marketplace is an international, illegal transaction, 
dialysis, or death. 
In the context of cadaveric exchanges, the problem is predominantly behavioral. Prior to 
SB 206, policy gave potential registrants the option of “yes” or “no” when presented with the 
choice to donate. Halpern (2013) has shown that people are more likely to go-with-the-flow and 
not opt into the system; he argues,  “In health care, as in many other facets of life, how decision 
options are presented influences the decisions people make” (Halpern, 2).  
While Halpern (2013) examines terminally ill patients, the behavioral psychology 
findings are consistent with public policy mechanisms that use status-quo biases to achieve their 
objectives. Participants in the Halpern study were terminally ill patients given the option of 
extended life care. In a response form, patients were presented with options to change their 
advanced directives. Advanced directives inform how doctors provide care during a time of 
crises. One option was to have the doctors provide life-extending care; even if it were extremely 
unlikely the patient would recover (Halpern 2013). For instance, if patient’s lungs were to fail or 
they go brain dead the option for life-extending care would direct their doctors to place them on 
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breathing machines. The other option was for the doctor to pull the plug and not provide 
emergency extending life care. 
A notable finding of Halpern (2013) is the effect a questions phrasing has on a patient’s 
response regarding the life or death implication of how a doctor will handle his or her end-of-life 
care. When the default presented was that of pulling the plug, patients were more inclined not to 
deviate from the status quo and request extending life care. When the question was instead posed 
with a presumption doctors would provide extended life care, patients were much more likely to 
request life extending service (Halpern, 2013). 
Stick-to-the-status-quo phenomena are not unique to patients in end of life care. 
Understanding that a person makes a decision based on the framing of a question makes it very 
applicable to Nevada’s organ donation process. Nevada Department of Motor Vehicle policy 
posited the question “would you like to become an organ donor” (Kieckheffer, 2015). Similar to 
the findings by Halpern, Kesseler and Roth (2015) people were more likely to stay non-organ 
donors because it was the default. The following section uses the status-quo presumption bias in 
favor of an opt-out organ donation policy. 
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Behavioral Economics In Support of an Opt-out Policy 
 
Ulen (2014) argues public policy can effectively promote desired outcomes through three 
overarching tools: financial incentives, social norms and psychological framing. As previously 
noted, financial incentives for organ donations are illegal under the National Organ Transplant 
Act of 1984. However, Kaseran and Rigmar (2013) suggest financial incentives are the best way 
to increase the supply of organs. Like any other good, making production profitable could create 
an incentive for people to supply organs. A person would make the calculated decision to sell his 
or her organs to avoid going into debt or fund a start-up business.   
Legality aside, Capron (2010) suggests a crowd-out of intrinsic motivations for donating 
would occur as a result of monetizing the good. Capron suggests the result would be a net 
decrease in supply citing two main reasons. The first is psychic shifts. Citizens would no longer 
see the problem as important enough to donate to because potential recipients would instead be 
able to purchase organs. Second are reputational shifts. In a society that values wealth, a classist 
stigma against donors would arise. Donors bearing a scar after surgery would be seen as needing 
money because they sold their organs. Individuals who do not deem the payment enough to 
compensate for the stigma would be less likely to register as organ donors.  
Decker (2014) claims intrinsic motivations crowd-out extrinsic motivations citing an 
Israeli day-care study. After a day-care realized children’s parents were picking up their children 
after a mandated dismissal time they attempted to create financial repercussions for parents. 
Through the institution of fines they believed parents would behave differently and pick up their 
children from daycare on time. Instead, the results were more students being left at the day-care 
passed dismissal time, which created a larger problem than they had before. Behaviorally, the 
parents shifted their perspective on picking up their children. Before the fine they felt obligated 
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on a moral basis out of respect for the people working at the day care. When the decision became 
financial they saw the exchange as a calculated decision and chose to leave their children at the 
day-care for longer.   
These studies may not be entirely predictive. The sample size for Israeli study was 
parents who were able to make the financial decision to continue at work and pay the daycare. 
People who would most likely sell their kidneys are in a greater financial bind.  Either way the 
future does not hold legalization any time soon. In using Roth’s characterization, a legalized 
market for the sale and purchase of organs is too “repugnant” in the eyes of U.S. citizens, thus 
alternatives public policy solutions must be found. 
In order to develop policies not using financial incentives, framing an important tool in 
crafting public policy. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) tasked people to decide disease response 
strategies that would affect 600 people. Using two different subject groups Tversky and 
Kahneman framed the question in two distinct ways. In layout one, they claimed the program 
would either save 200 lives and has either a 33% chance of saving 600 people or a 66% chance 
of saving no one. In layout two they said the program would either result in the death of 400 
people, or has a 33% chance no one dies and a 66% chance everyone dies. 
Both of these strategies have the same mathematical odds and results. The difference is 
the way the information is presented to the subject. In the first layout the number of individuals 
who live is highlighted. The second layout highlights the number of individuals who die. When 
presented with the first layout 70% of people preferred to save 200 lives than risk saving more 
lives with a chance of saving no one. When presented with the second layout 78% of people 
preferred to risk the assured safety of 200 people to attempt to save everyone.  The study shows 
that people do not always base decisions on the objective numbers presented, but rather that 
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framing can shape subjects responses to questions. Public policy can use framing in a way to 
advance goals.   
The default option can also greatly affect a person’s response. Establishing a default 
decreases the transaction costs associated with making a tough decision that deviates from the 
status quo. Ulen (2014) argues as long as material transaction costs are kept low enough that they 
allow people the ability to choose, decision architects should have free range to establish 
defaults. Organ donations are ripe for a default system to increase donations. There are three 
principle default systems with organ donations. The first is the former Nevada system where the 
default is respondents remain non-organ donors. The second is the new Nevada system when a 
person defaults as “not an organ donor at this time.” The third is a system whereby individuals 
are presumed organ donors unless they choose not to be. Transaction costs are kept low for those 
who wish to not be an organ donor under the third system. A citizen who wishes to not donate 
can opt-out at the DMV at the time of license registration or renewal. 
Johnson and Goldstein (2003) attempt to determine if people would donate more often 
when the default rule for organ donations changed. To test this hypothesis they used an online 
survey with 161 subjects. Participants were told they had recently changed residences to new 
states. Because of the participant’s relocation, the respondents were asked if they would like to 
be an organ donor. To determine which system resulted in more organ donations, each group of 
respondents was presented a different default system. One-third of respondents were presented 
an opt-in policy where the default is they are not organ donor. Then respondents were asked if 
they would like to become an organ donor. One third was presented an opt-out model and told 
the default rule established them as an organ donor. The group was then asked if they would like 
to not be an organ donor. The third group of respondents was told there was no default and 
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presented with a mandated choice model where they had to respond either “yes” or “no” to 
becoming an organ donor.  
The results affirm the default rule in the context of organ donations. Respondents were 
more than twice as likely to be registered organ donors after the questionnaire when they were 
told the default rule is that they are organ donors. The likelihood of becoming an organ donor 
was also higher for those who were told there was no default. 
The empirical data supporting an opt-out policy is also persuasive. Shepard, Carroll, and 
Ferguson (2014) compared kidney donation levels in countries with opt-out and opt-in policies 
over a 13-year time period. In total, 23 countries in the study had opt-out policies and 25 
required people opt-in. Their findings were significant; they showed a 5% increase in cadaveric 
transplants, and larger increase in total donors under an opt-out policy. Most examples of opt-out 
systems being implemented have shown increases in organ donations (Argentina, Italy, Russia, 
etc.). Countries that experienced a decline in donations also experienced a decline in the overall 
trust of medical professionals which impacted the likelihood potential donors would opt-out. 
France and Brazil are cited as having lower donations after public policy change. 
Davotich (2008) and Calandrillo (2004) both conducted studies on the propensity of 
organ donors to not deviate from the status quo. Instead of doing something they genuinely 
support, based on opinion polls, they tended to go with the flow without placing much ethical 
consideration in their actions. A change in the policy could preserve rights based objections 
while materially increasing organ supplies significantly in the state. 
Ferreria (2015) argues there may be a self-selection bias that makes empirical examples 
not as applicable to the United States. Countries with social norms making them more altruistic, 
such as the northern European nations that have implemented an opt-out system, may have 
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adopted the policy because they were already inclined to donate. However Shepard et Al (2014), 
Davotich (2008) quantify the increase while accounting for self-selection bias. The two 
researchers found status quo bias as a larger factor than self-selection in the likelihood an opt-out 
policy increases organ donors.  
Status quo bias has been well studied in both psychology and economics. People are 
more inclined default than deviate their current state of being. Thaler and Sunstein (2008) 
conducted studies regarding the likelihood of professors to update their IRA account 
information. Even though many of the professors have become married since their time of 
registering for retirement savings, they still list their mother as the top beneficiary. The 
transaction costs of changing the beneficiary require filling out paperwork, which could take up 
to 15 minutes. Because their current state is functioning well they are less inclined to change 
their default.  
It is easy to understand why this could occur to people at the DMV. Take John, for 
example, who is going to get his license for the first time. Even though John made an 
appointment, the local DMV is understaffed so he has to wait an hour or so before he can take 
his official driving exam. During this time John is frantically studying notes, thinking about the 
steps of driving a car, and conversing with his mother about how great it will be once he gets his 
license. John then takes the driving test and passes with flying colors. As he waits in line to take 
his picture, eye exam and fills out more paperwork, he is not in the best situation to think about 
how his body will be used after his death. 
Ten years later John is back at the DMV to update his license. John goes right when the 
DMV opens to assure he is in and out to make his 10AM meeting. There are some delays but he 
gets through quickly. However, because he John was thinking about his meeting he quickly 
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skimmed the paperwork and only marked what he need to mark. The result was John not 
marking “yes” to the “would you like to be an organ donor” question. John is one of the many 
people who would be helped by the institution of an opt-out policy. An opt-out system would 
remove the unnecessary transaction costs that exist under an opt-out system. 
These are the experiences of people whom are asked to be organ donors every day. The 
high-pressure, often times cramped environment is not the ideal situation to liberate potential 
organ donors and expose their true desire. Shepard et Al (2014) suggests changing the default 
policy is “likely to bridge the gap between people’s intentions and their behavior”(Shepard et Al, 
3). If people support organ donations, changing the default would allow their choices to 
accurately reflect their desires. 
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Conclusion 
 
Nevada should adopt an opt-out organ donation policy. The statewide shortage and recent 
legislative momentum make Nevada ripe for public policy change.  In using a libertarian 
paternalistic strategy, changing the frame of organ donation requests will allow citizens to 
express their preferences accurately while preserving Nevada citizens’ ability to choose freely. 
Absent policy change, status quo bias and default rules will shape decision makers towards not 
donating even if they would objectively prefer to donate their organs. Decreasing transactions 
costs through an opt-out policy would help the organ market function more efficiently and 
increase the number of organ donors.  More donors mean better matches and more lives saved. 
Through a minor shift in policy, during the next legislative session Nevada can save the lives of 
those currently waiting on a Nevada donor registry. 
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Appendix 1: Priority Preference System Policy Recommendation 
 
Nevada could adopt a Priority-preference system. Under this regulatory framework 
people who become organ donors would receive higher priority when they needed an organ 
donation than people who had not registered. This system could be instituted concurrently with 
an opt-out policy to achieve desirable results. Because financial incentives are illegal, Roth and 
Kessler (2015) have been attempting to craft policies that allow non-monetary compensation so 
as to comply with federal statute banning monetary-compensation. Israel and Singapore are 
countries that have implemented a priority preference system to achieve this goal. Registered 
donors of the two nations are given priority in receiving organs.  
Roth and Kessler’s (2015) findings were consistent with self-interested economics. A 
large portion of society registered as donors because the potential donor valued the non-
pecuniary benefit of priority in the organ receiving process. This was because of the priority 
preference system.  
Imagine a situation where two people with identical biological compatibility are on 
waiting lists for a kidney transplant. However, only one of the two people is a registered organ 
donor. Soon after both people have been placed on a waiting list one kidney becomes available 
of which they are both a perfect match. Under a priority preference system the registered organ 
donor would receive the kidney and the non-registered person would have to wait for another. 
The priority preference models incentive is the increased likelihood of receiving an organ.  A 
priority preference system creates an incentive that is to some more valuable than the transaction 
costs of registering as an organ donor.  
Limitations in enforcing contracts of donors after they are deceased could prevent priority 
preference systems from increasing donations. Current organ donation processes authorize next 
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of kin to override the deceased prior request to become an organ donor (Ferreria, 2015). Because 
next of kin could veto a prior commitment, if this exemption were adopted in a Nevada model 
the priority mechanism may not be as effective without proper enforcement.  To evaluate the 
effectiveness of a system with the priority loophole Roth and Kessler allowed individuals who 
have already benefited to opt-out, via there liaison, after the their death therefore reimbursing the 
initial cost of donation. Roth and Kessler’s concluded this loophole could completely eliminate 
the benefits of a priority system, citing a crowd-out of altruistic motivations when an incentive is 
introduced.2 Structuring a system of body property rights whereby individuals were bound by 
their commitments to become donors could alleviate this concern.  
                                                        
2 A potential flaw not discussed in this model is the prospect of would-be donors cheating the system. Because a person does not have 
to be in good health to register as an organ donor, at the first sign of health trouble they could register to gain priority. The result would be a lot of 
new donors, but more donors who are also in need of an organ.  
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Appendix 2: Strengthening Facilities and Enforcement of Paired Exchanges 
 
Never could better facilitate concurrent and non-concurrent paired Exchanges through 
improved facilities and contract enforcement. Non-concurrent donor pairings are a viable 
solution if a patient has a loved one willing to donate. However, institutional limitations and 
uncertainty has deterred some perfectly matched pairs from conducting exchanges. To resolve 
institutional problems, medical infrastructure in Nevada would need to improve its healthcare 
infrastructure. Concurrent donations require more operating space and doctors. It is possible a 
UNLV Medical School would improve the local medical economy enough for facilities to 
facilitate these exchanges, but more research is needed to be conclusive.   
 For non-concurrent exchanges the solution is more difficult. Enforcement of a contract 
between a two donor pairs may reduce the uncertainty of exchanges occurring at different times. 
More effective enforcement of property rights and binding contracts to ensure the transaction 
eventually occurs would provide confidence when hospitals are not able to conduct operations 
concurrently. Enforcement of body property rights would also make a priority preference policy 
mechanism more effective.  
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Appendix 3: Strengthen National Donor Networks 
 
Larger networks lead to better matches and more organ donations. As our population 
grows larger, compatibility declines with genetic diversification. Roth (2012) notes connecting 
longer chains with recipients who have paired donors, that are incompatible, means the market 
functions better. In 2002 a task force was started by the Nevada Attorney Generals office to look 
at problems with the supply chain. Nothing formal has yet to come from this process. Increased 
attention from the Nevada executive branch could improve the network. 
One potential method would be for non-profit organizations that register donors to 
encourage paired exchanges among living donor candidates. At present, paired exchanges are 
facilitated by organ transplant centers in connection with a national network. Non-profit 
organizations, such as the Nevada Donor Network, do not allow registries of pairs seeking 
exchange with another pair. While they do register donors more generally, the addition of a 
portion that facilitates exchanges could encourage localized donation exchanges.  
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